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Introduction
Reverse procurement platforms which enable buyers to place requests for proposal online 
and then offer suppliers the possibility to bid for contracts have been intensely used in a 
B2B-context for several years. Since about 2004, such platforms have become available to 
ordinary consumers and are constantly gaining in popularity. Being primarily a tool to 
increase  competition,  these  platforms  generate  significant  consumer  surplus  and  exert 
intense price pressure on the suppliers. As the analysis of data from the painting industry 
shows,  auction  prices  are  almost  always  far  below  the  industrial  average  (Klafft  and 
Spiekermann 2006). In most extreme cases, painters agreed to work for as little as € 4 per 
hour  (compared to  an average wage for  painters  of  €  12,98 according to  Statistisches 
Bundesamt 2005). This raises the question how potential suppliers – many of whom are 
small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  (SME)  or  even  self-employed  persons  with  little 
auctioning experience – can exploit the potential benefits of the new platforms without 
becoming victims of phenomena like the winner’s curse. One solution to this problem can 
be decision support systems which assist the SMEs during the bid preparation phase. The 
goal of such systems can be described as follows: Maximize the expected contribution to 
profit of a bid portfolio by taking into consideration the supplier’s capacity constraints. In 
this paper, a decision model will be presented which uses likelihood of success functions 
derived from empirical data to solve the abovementioned optimisation problem.
Determining likelihood of success functions from empirical data
Empirical  data  on  procurement  auctions  for  three  standardised  services  (sanding  and 
sealing of planks, tiling, painting of ingrain wallpapers, downloaded from the platform 
www.letsworkit.de)  served  as  an  input  for  the  derivation  of  functional  relationships 
between  a  bid  and  its  likelihood  of  success.  For  each  service  category,  the  price 
distribution of winning bids (normalised on a per m²  basis)  was determined.  Figure 1 
shows  as  an  example  the  empirically  determined  distribution  for  painting  of  ingrain 
wallpapers.
M.Klafft
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
price in € per m ²
y observed
Figure 1: Painting of wallpapers – distribution of winning bid prices in € per m²
All three distributions showed similar distribution patterns which closely resembled the 
ones observed in biological growth processes (Lopez et al 2004). It was therefore decided 
to use biological growth functions as candidates for the functional approximation of the 
winning bid distribution. Candidate functions included 
- the Gompertz-function: 
- the von-Bertalanffy function:
- the logistic function: ( ) xTekxF ⋅−⋅+= 1
1
 and
- the Janoschek-function (Janoschek 1957): ( ) CxbexF ⋅−−= 1
All these functions were fitted to the three observed distributions by performing a least 
square minimisation (see e.g.  Hartung et  al.  1995) using Newton’s algorithm (see e.g. 
Rardin 1998). The goodness of fit was then evaluated by calculating the remaining sum of 
squares due to error (SSE). The results are displayed in Tables 1 to 3.
Table 1: Goodness of fit - Sanding and sealing of planks (n = 25 observations)
Approximation function: Gompertz Bertalanffy logistic Janoschek
SSE: 0,023 0,021 0,056 0,059
Table 2: Goodness of fit -Tiling (n = 60 observations)
Approximation function: Gompertz Bertalanffy logistic Janoschek
SSE: 0,107 0,099 0,203 0,272
Table 3: Goodness of fit - Painting of ingrain wallpapers (n = 45 observations)
Approximation function: Gompertz Bertalanffy logistic Janoschek
SSE: 0,036 0,036 0,050 0,041
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The results show that von-Bertalanffy-functions are best suited for modelling the distribu-
tion of winning bids at consumer-oriented reverse procurement auctions. The likelihood 
that a bid with a given price xB per unit will be rejected in such an auction can therefore be 
modelled as:
(1)
with a = 1, x0 = 0, xB > 0 and b,c, and d positive values to be determined through least 
square fitting or an alternative fitting method. In the three cases under analysis here, the 
optimal values for b,c and d were the following:
Table 4: Optimisation results for the von-Bertalanffy approximation
Optimization results: parameter b parameter c parameter d
Painting 0,03101 0,69012 57,36920
Tiling 0,13429 0,00000 1,43405
Sanding and Sealing 0,04656 0,00000 6,81197
The resulting von-Bertalanffy-functions provide a good fit in the sanding and the painting 
case, and an acceptable fit in the tiling case, as can be seen in figures 2 to 4.
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      Figure 2: Sanding and sealing of planks – a von-Bertalanffy approximation of the 
winning bid distribution
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Figure 3: Tiling (excluding material costs) – a von-Bertalanffy approximation of the 
winning bid distribution
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Figure 4: Painting of ingrain wallpapers – a von-Bertalanffy approximation of the 
winning bid distribution
Approximation formula (1) applies to the whole set of auctions within a service category 
regardless of the starting price stated by the buyer. Furthermore, this formula does not take 
into consideration bids which may have already been placed in an ongoing auction. In 
reality, the starting price or the current best bid constitute a maximum price per unit xmax 
which cannot be exceeded in a specific auction. In order to take this into consideration, 
formula (1) has to be readjusted as follows:
  (2)
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In the following paragraph, F2 will be used as an input for an optimisation model which 
aims at maximising a supplier’s contribution to profit by optimising bids within a given 
auction portfolio.
Maximising the Contribution to Profit
Knowledge  about  the  relationship  between  a  bid  and  the  corresponding  likelihood  of 
rejection enables suppliers to maximise the expected contribution to profit of an auction 
portfolio.  This  chapter  presents  an  optimisation  model  for  this  task,  based  upon  the 
following modelling assumptions:
- During  the  auction  process,  the  only  information  visible  at  the  platform is  the 
starting price or, if bidding has already begun, the current best bid. The precise bid 
history is kept secret until the auction ends.
- Due to typically low contract volumes (usually € 1000 or less) and long auction 
durations  (from  several  days  to  weeks),  suppliers  do  not  monitor  the  auction 
actively but let bidding agents work for them. Bidding agents outbid all competitors 
until the predefined minimum bid is reached.
- The  supplier  is  operating  under  capacity  constraints.  Exceeding  the  available 
capacity for a given resource results in penalties.
- Additionally, there are also absolute capacity limits which must not be exceeded 
under any circumstances.
Introducing the supplier’s  variable costs  (per unit)  as  xvar,  the expected contribution to 
profit ECTP for a minimum bid xB submitted to the bidding agent can then be calculated as
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )∫ −+−⋅−= max max2max2varmax ,1,1,
x
x
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Let’s now consider a risk-neutral supplier with limited production capacities who wants to 
maximize  the  contribution  to  profit  of  a  portfolio  comprising  i  reverse  auctions.  We 
introduce
- Participation variables Pi ∈ {0,1}, one for each auction i;
- Decision variables xB,i denoting the minimum bid to be entered into the bidding 
agent for auction i (xvar,i < xB,i < xmax,i);
- Expected contributions to profit per unit ECTP,i(xB,i, xmax,i);
- Contract sizes Ai > 0;
- Fixed transaction costs for bid submission Ti > 0;
- Variables ci,j denoting the consumption of resource j for one unit of contract i;
- Capacity constraints Cj > 0 which, if violated, lead to fixed penalties Sj > 0, and 
- Absolute capacity constraints Cj,max ≥ Cj which must not be exceeded under any 
circumstances.
Using  these  variables,  the  optimisation  problem to  be  solved  by  the  supplier  can  be 
described as follows:
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The optimisation model in (4) is only exemplary and can be easily adopted to match the 
specific needs of a particular supplier. It is, for example, possible to model any polynomial 
penalty  function  by  adding additional  Macauley bracket  terms,  and the  supplier’s  risk 
preferences might be taken into consideration by weighing the penalty terms with a risk 
preference factor.
Conclusion, Limitations and Outlook
Optimisation models like the one presented here enable SME suppliers to manage their bid 
portfolios  more  systematically  and  efficiently.  They  prevent  suppliers  from  placing 
“ruinous” bids by pursuing the overall goal of CTP maximisation without being misled by 
any  psychological  factors.  As  a  result,  bidding  at  consumer-oriented  procurement 
platforms will  become more  predictable  and  less  risky.  If  such  optimisation  tools  are 
integrated into bidding agents, auction platform providers can offer an additional service to 
the  suppliers:  the  real-time  optimisation  of  bid-portfolios.  As  the  use  of  agents 
significantly reduces transaction costs, permanent monitoring of a set of auctions becomes 
feasible. Therefore, CTP optimisation calculations can be constantly updated according to 
the latest bid developments, thus significantly improving the quality of bidding decisions. 
However, the applicability of the model presented in this paper is still somewhat limited:
- So  far,  the  model  is  only  suitable  for  auctions  dealing  with  standardised  and 
homogeneous services and
- the model does not take into consideration additional information emerging during 
the auction, such as the number of participating bidders (which most auction portals 
display at the respective website).
Future work will concentrate on the elimination of these shortcomings, before a prototype 
of an enhanced bidding agent with an integrated optimisation tool can be developed and 
tested.  Another  issue  which  needs  to  be  addressed  is  how  the  widespread  use  of 
optimisation agents may influence bidding habits and the resulting auction prices – as this 
might induce a change in the observed price distribution functions. It will therefore be 
essential to monitor price distributions very closely after the enhanced bidding agents have 
been deployed. 
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